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A Strategy for Creating Laws Not Constrained by
Technological Obsolescence
[ By Jay Campbell*]
scar Wilde once observed, "[i]t is
only the modern that ever
becomes old fashioned."1
Nowhere is this paradox more
evident than in the area of
advanced technology. The
pursuit of new technology has
been the hallmark of Western civilization
since the dawn of the industrial era. Simply
put, as technology develops, older equipment
becomes obsolete. The renowned economist
have been able to increase worker
productivity at an almost unthinkable rate
by incorporating the latest technology.
4
Additionally, the lives of average people have
been undeniably affected by the adoption of
new technologies - technologies, such as the
Internet that allow access to near infinite stores
of information from almost any location.
5
While fear of technology has spawned a
number of "doomsday-type" action movies,6
society has recognized the gains attendant to
"Laws tend to be written to address
the particular technologies of the
day, and as that technology becomes
obsolete, the laws related to that
technology become obsolete too.
Joseph Schumpeter coined this process,
naming it "creative destruction."2 As new
innovations are adopted, older technologies
are swept aside, never to be used again.3
In recent decades, our society has
become more apt to embrace changes in
technology. Businesses in the United States
technology and has become more
comfortable accepting new technology.
The legal system, however, does not
adapt so quickly. It has been said that "the
wheels of justice grind slow, but exceedingly
fine." 7 Whether law is created through the
judicial or legislative process, it is rare that it
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can be created rapidly. In recent memory, only
the anti-terror laws created in the wake of 9/11
and the corporate laws created after the Enron
and WorldCom scandals were enacted with any
rapidity.8 Most other laws have been forced to
grind their way through the legal machine.
The legal system's inherent slowness can
be a detriment to society when it comes to
dealing with advanced technology. Laws tend
to be written to address the particular
technologies of the day. As that technology
becomes obsolete, the laws related to that
technology become obsolete too. The laws
must be created anew to address the new







a time lag between the obsolescence of the law
relating to the old technology and the creation
of law addressing the new technology. During
this time lag, there is a significant opportunity
for abuse. Thus, the question arises: how can
the legal system reduce the amount of time
between technology adoption and proper
regulation?
This note will examine the obsolescence
of laws through the lens of recent cases relating
to "wiretapping laws" and propose the creation
of laws that protect certain rights independent
of technology. Recently, a number of courts
have held that laws created in the mid-1980's
to protect communications do not apply to
Internet-related communications, reasoning
that the method of transmission falls outside
the language of the statutes. 9 As a result, e-
mail and other forms of Internet-based
communications are treated differently from
older forms of communication such as
telephone conversations. 10 This note will
propose a broad legislative solution with the
aim of both extending protections to the new
forms of communication and providing a
framework for dealing with new forms of
communications technology as they are
developed." Though this specific solution will
apply merely to the technology at issue, the
same approach could be used to address other
technologies that have not yet been created.
Section II will briefly lay out the
development of the current wiretapping laws.
Section III will illustrate the two-fold problem
that the recent court cases have created. Finally,
Section IV will evaluate possible methods for





ig to the invadee's
I. Background: The Evolution of the
Wiretapping Laws and the Right to
Privacy
Protecting privacy in communication is
by no means a recent proposition.
Communication via mail has been protected
against unwanted searches since the 1870's.12
In Ex Parte Jackson, the Supreme Court held
that the constitutional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures extend to
peoples' papers that have been closed against
inspection.13 The Court further held that letters
could be searched only after a warrant was
procured, stating that "[n]o law of Congress
can place in the hands of officials connected
with the postal service any authority to invade
the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages
in the mail." 4 This protection of mail was later
codified by Congress and remains in force
today.
15
Though the telephone was invented in
1876, it was not given protections similar to
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those afforded postal mail until the mid
1960's.16 This is shocking, as the information
obtainable through telephone conversations
can be much more private than that found in
mail. The Senate Judiciary Committee
observed:
[w]hen the Framers of the Constitution
acted to guard against the arbitrary use
of Government power to maintain
surveillance over citizens, there were
limited methods of intrusion into the
"houses, papers, and effects" protected
by the fourth amendment. During the
intervening 200 years, development of
new methods of communication and
devices for surveillance has expanded
dramatically the opportunity for such
intrusions. 17
Telephone conversations were first protected
from surveillance by authorities on
constitutional grounds by the Supreme
Court,18 and state courts created a form of the
"invasion of privacy" tort to protect against
surveillance by civilians. 9
A. The Right to Privacy: The Start-
ing Point of the Wiretapping Law
The right to privacy has been
developing in the U.S. since the late 1 9 th
century.20 The idea of a "right to privacy" was
first championed in one of the most famous
law review and aptly named articles of all time,
The Right to Privacy.21 Justices Louis Brandeis
and Samuel Warren argued that the common
law grows in order to better protect society.
22
Thus, laws protecting against threat of injury
as well as injuries to one's reputation emanated
from laws protecting against bodily injury.
23
Brandeis and Warren believed that it was time
for the law to grow again.24
Brandeis and Warren stated that the
advance in communications technology
necessitated laws to protect against injurious
invasions of privacy.2 5 After looking at a
number of English common law cases, they
drew the conclusion that courts could protect
a person's privacy.2 6 Thoughts, emotions, and
sentiments expressed in writing or the arts could
be prevented from publication by their
respective author.27 Thus, by protecting a
person's right to privacy, courts are merely
enforcing that individual's rights.28 Brandeis
and Warren then proposed a tort which would
protect individual's privacy to the extent that
the individual kept their private life private.29
In situations involving wiretapping, state courts
enacted this tort in the form of invasion of
privacy.3
0
B. Development of Tort of Invasion
of Privacy for Unreasonable
Intrusion.
Due to the unwillingness of federal
courts to protect telephonic communication, 3
the earliest protections came by way of state
court tort adjudication. 32 Following the
publication of Brandeis and Warren's article,
state courts began to apply the doctrine the
authors had proffered and essentially created
the tort of "Invasion of Privacy.""3 As early as
1931, state courts held that wiretapping was a
legally redressable invasion of privacy.4 The
tort is currently recognized in almost all
jurisdictions though the specifics of the tort and
its application vary. 5  Cases involving
misappropriation of communication fall under
the unreasonable intrusion strain of the tort.
36
Although most state courts recognize
wiretapping to be an invasion of privacy and
generally agree to the basic scope of the tort,
they differ on certain specifics.' 7 The courts
agree that there must be an intrusion into a
matter that is, and is entitled to be, private. 8
Stated differently, for the protections to apply,
the matter at issue must be of the type normally
kept private. Pretrial testimony, police
photography, and corporate records made
public by law are among those matters not
considered to be kept private. 9 Furthermore,
most actions or statements made in public are
not considered private.40 Thus, the courts agree
as to the broad application of the tort.
The courts diverge, however, when it
comes to some of the specifics of the tort as it41
relates to wiretapping. Some courts have
followed a more permissible standard, finding
liability where a wire had been tapped but no
one was listening and where the information
found by way of wiretapping was not disclosed
to third parties.42 Others require that there be
evidence that the wrongly obtained information
be disclosed to unauthorized persons.4' Thus,
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice535
INTERNET
though the courts agree in the broad strokes
about invasion of privacy, the patchwork of
different state law can render the tort difficult
to pursue.
C. Creation of Protections From
Governmental Intrusion
Protections against wiretapping were
enacted on a federal level decades after state
tort protections appeared. 44 The federal
protections first emerged in Supreme Court
adjudication as protections against government
intrusions under the Fourth Amendment.4 s
When Congress codified these protections, they
expanded them to protect citizens from both
government and civilian actors.46
1. Olmstead v. United States:
The Court restricts search and
seizure protections to the
physical realm
In early decisions, the Supreme Court
was initially skeptical of protections against
wiretapping and refused to extend any
protection similar to that afforded mail to
telephone communication.47 For example, in
Olmstead v. United States ("Olmstead") the
defendants were convicted of conspiracy to
violate the National Prohibition Act by
importing alcohol. 48 The conspiracy was
discovered when federal agents tapped the
phone lines of the conspirators.4" Finding that
the Fourth Amendment protections against
search and seizure covered only the physical
realm, the Court held that the phone tapping
was permissible s.5  The Court stated:
[t]he United States takes no such care
of telegraph or telephone messages as
of mailed sealed letters. The [Fourth]
Amendment does not forbid what was
done here. There was no searching.
There was no seizure. The evidence was
secured by the sense of hearing and that
only.-"
The Court reasoned that a person who
"project[ed] his voice to those quite outside [his
home]" did not fall within the confines of the
Fourth Amendment because no physical
seizure had occurred.52
The Olmstead Court's decision was not
unanimous.5ss In a spirited dissent, Justice
Brandeis argued that there was no difference
between mail and telephone
communications.5 4 Both communications,
Brandeis reasoned, were provided by the
authority of the government, and any
distinction did not necessitate different
treatment.5 Recognizing that limiting the
Fourth Amendment to the physical realm could
bring about future ills, Brandeis opined:
[w]ays may some day be developed by
which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home. Advances in the psychic and
related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts
and emotions.
56
Brandeis stated that the makers of the
Constitution gave citizens the right to be left
alone and, to protect this right, all unjustifiable
government intrusions "must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment." 57 Thus,
Brandeis called for constitutional protections
which would have extended beyond the realm
of physical searches and seizures. Nevertheless,
the majority held the day and found that
wiretapping was not illegal.5 Brandeis' dissent
was remarkably prescient, however, as
Olmstead was not the end of the wiretapping
debate.
2. Katz v. U.S.: The Supreme
Court largely follows
Brandeis' logic and extends
protections to telephone
conversations
The Court revisited wiretapping in Katz
v. United States and chose to follow most of
Brandeis' reasoning.59 In Katz, the petitioner
had been convicted of making illegal wagers
based on telephone conversations that he made
in a public telephone booth that the FBI had
wiretapped.6" The Court of Appeals for the
Summer 2005
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Ninth Circuit evaluated the case using a
physical-realm focused Fourth Amendment
examination. 61 The Court of Appeals held that
there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment because "there [had been] no
physical entrance into the area occupied by the
petitioner. "62
The Supreme Court in Katz rejected the
Olmstead Court's reasoning, stating that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places," 63 and "[wiherever a man may be, he is
entitled to know that he will remain free from
The year after the Supreme Court
decided Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196871
("wiretapping laws"). This legislation
responded to the Katz decision by creating a
scheme under which the government could use
wiretapping in law enforcement after receiving
authorization from a judicial official.
7 2
Protections from the law extended against both
government and civilian actors. 73 The 1968
wiretapping law, however, covered only oral
"...although the Constitution
protected persons from government
intrusion, a person's general right to
privacy was an issue for individual
States to decide, much like the
protection of personal property."
unreasonable searches and seizures." 64 The
Court held that the government violated the
privacy that the defendant justifiably relied
upon through its electronic surveillance.65 The
majority stated that whatever a person seeks
to preserve as private may be protected by the
Constitution.6  Further, the Court held that this
privacy could only be invaded by the
government after it has "advance authorization
by a magistrate upon a showing of probable
cause."
67
However, the Katz Court refused to
apply Brandeis' broad view regarding the right
to be left alone. 68 The majority held that,
although the Constitution protected persons
from government intrusion, a person's general
right to privacy was an issue for individual states
to resolve, much like the protection of personal
property.69 The states have, for the most part,
created such rights.
7°
3. The prohibitions against
wiretappin were enacted in
1968, and tIhen amended in
1986 after they had become
obsolete
communications carried over common
telephone carriers.
74
Congress recognized that the years
following 1968 saw rapid changes in the
communications industry. Many new
technologies including electronic mail, cellular
telephones, pagers, and video teleconferences
were not considered in the 1968 law.
75
Furthermore, with the breakup of the AT&T
monopoly, many telephone calls were no longer
carried by common carriers and did not fall
within the scope of the wiretapping laws.76 The
Senate observed that, though a first-class letter
was afforded a high level of security, no
comparable security existed for "new non-
common carrier communication services.
" 77
Therefore, after concluding that the present
laws were "hopelessly out of date," Senator
Patrick Leahy introduced legislation that would
overhaul the wiretapping scheme.
78
The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 updated the wiretapping
laws "in light of the dramatic changes in new
computer and telecommunication
technologies."79 It remains the primary
protection of communications. Although
amendments have been made over time, most
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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notably with the enacting of the Patriot Act,
the structure of the wiretapping laws has not
changed since 1986.80
The current wiretapping scheme is
divided into two main sections: Title I and Title
11.81 Title I governs the interception of wire and
electronic communications. 2 Title II governs
stored communications and transactional
recordsA.3 Title I expands the provisions of the
1968 law to cover different forms of oral and
aural communication.8 4 This title prohibits the
interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communication, as well as the disclosure of
information thereby obtained, unless the
interception was authorized by court order.'5
It broadly defines "intercept" to include "the
aural or other acquisition of the contents of any
wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
or other device." 6 Further, this title broadly
defines "oral communication" as including any
oral communication where a person has a
reasonable expectation that the
communication will not be intercepted.87 Thus,
Congress expanded the law to include new
forms of technology.
Whereas Title I was a mere expansion
of old laws, Title II was a completely new legal
scheme.8 Recognizing that a whole host of new
communications options had emerged in what
we now know as the Internet, Title II was
Congress' attempted to extend the same
protections to these new mediums.8 9 The
statute outlaws the unauthorized access to
"facilities through which electronic
communications service is provided." 90 In
other words, Title II protects servers which are
used for transmission of e-mails from some
unauthorized intrusions.9' However, it includes
an exception that allows service providers to
access the stored communications.9 2 Thus,
service providers can look into the e-mails
stored on their servers without violating the
statute.
93
D. Recent Court Rulings Show
That the Law has Again Become
Obsolete with Respect to Wire-
tapping Prohibitions
Despite the best efforts of Congress to
pass comprehensive wiretapping laws, recent
court rulings have shown the law to be obsolete
and in need of repair. The First, Third, Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal
have found areas in which the current
wiretapping laws do not protect
communications.94
The Fifth Circuit was the first decide that
the wiretapping laws did not apply to a new
form of communication. 95 In Steven Jackson
Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, the
Secret Service seized a computer which
operated a Bulletin Board Service.
96
Subsequently the Secret Service read and
deleted a number of e-mails which were stored
on the same computer. 97 The Steven Jackson
Games court found that the Secret Service's
actions did not violate the wiretapping laws
because the e-mails did not constitute protected
electronic communications. 98 The Steven
Jackson Games court, following a plain-text
reading of the wiretapping laws, stated that:
[t]he E-mail at issue was in "electronic
storage." Congress' use of the word
"transfer" in the definition of "electronic
communication," and its omission in
that definition of the phrase "any
electronic storage of such
communication" (part of the definition
of the definition of "wire
communication") reflects that Congress
did not intend for "intercept" to apply
to "electronic communications" when
those communications are in
"electronic storage. " 99
Thus, the Steven Jackson Games court held that,
due to Congress' formulation of the wiretapping
laws, e-mail stored on a computer is not
protected communication.
Similarly, in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc., ("Konop") the Ninth Circuit held that an
"interception" can only occur during the
transmission of electronic data.' In Konop, a
pilot for Hawaiian Airlines created a website
critical of his employer, keeping the website
secure by allowing only authorized users with
a username and password to access it. 10
Subsequently, a vice president of the airline
accessed the website using another employee's
username and password.0 2 The court held that
the vice president's actions did not constitute
an "interception" under the Stored
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Communications Act ("SCA"). 113 Adopting the
reasoning that it had stated in United States v.
Smith'014 - that communications covered by the
SCA are afforded less protections than those
covered under the Wiretap Act - the court held
"that for a website to be intercepted in violation
of the [Wiretap laws], it must be acquired
during transmission, not while it is in electronic
storage."10 5 Thus, the court held that an
"interception" had not occurred because the
data had not been acquired during the
transmission.
10 6
Most recently, the First Circuit adopted
the Fifth and Ninth Circuit's definition of
interception. 10 In U.S. v. Councilman, a book
dealer provided his clients with e-mail
accounts.111  The dealer then installed a
program on his server that sent copies of any
client e-mail from Amazon.com to his
mailbox. 12 After adopting the narrow reading
of the SCA, the court observed that "the
language [of the wiretapping laws] may be out
of step with the technological realities of
computer crimes." 113 Further, the court stated
"much of the [wiretap laws] protection may
"...unless some type of automatic
routing software is used ... inter-
ception of E-mail within the pro-
hibition of the Wiretap Act is vir-
tually impossible"
The reasoning of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits has been adopted by the Eleventh and
Third circuits.' 7 In United States v. Steiger, the
Eleventh Circuit observed that:
... very few seizures of electronic
communications from computers will
constitute "interceptions." There is only
a narrow window during which an E-
mail interception may occur - the
seconds or mili-seconds (sic) before
which a newly composed message is
saved to any temporary location
following a send command. Therefore,
unless some type of automatic routing
software is used ... interception of E-
mail within the prohibition of the
Wiretap Act is virtually impossible.
0 8
Similarly in Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company, the Third Circuit noted that
"[w]hile Congress's definition of "intercept"
does not appear to fit with its intent to extend
protection to electronic communications, it is
for Congress to cover the bases untouched."0 9
have been eviscerated by the realities of modem
technology."1 14 Judge Lipez, dissenting, stated
his belief that the wiretapping laws were unclear
on the issue at hand, but that congressional
intent clearly expressed a desire to protect e-
mails." 5
E. Legislative Responses to the
Recent Court Rulings
Understandably, the recent rulings by
the Circuit Courts have led to a public outcry.
116
A reporter for The New York Times observed:
America's right to privacy will be
seriously eroded if e-mail is not
protected by wiretap laws. The
implications of this erosion extend
beyond the commercial realm...
Congress ought to update the law to
make it clear that e-mail is entitled to
the same protections as a phone call.
117
On July 22, 2004, barely a month after
the First Circuit's ruling in Councilman, two bills
were submitted to Congress that sought to
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correct the deficiencies in the wiretapping
laws.118 House Resolution 4956, proposed by
Congressman Inslee, would remedy the
problem by expanding the definition of
"interception" to include "the acquisition of the
contents of the communication through the use
of any electronic, mechanical or other device,
at any point between the point of origin and
the point when it is made available to the
recipient." 19 Similarly, House Resolution 4977,
introduced by Congressman Nadler, would
remedy the problem by expanding the
definition of "electronic communication" to
include "any temporary, intermediate storage
of that communication incidental to the
communication thereof." 12° Thus, both bills
would amend the wiretapping laws and protect
Internet-based communications that are in
temporary storage on a server by either
expanding the definition of interception or the
definition of electronic communications.
121
Further, both bills would limit the protections
granted to service providers under the SCA by
forcing the providers to show that they accessed
the e-mails for the purpose of providing their
service or protecting the rights of their
customers or themselves.
1 22
II. The Cases Raise a Two-fold
Problem: How Can We Protect
Internet-based Communications
and Ensure That Communications
Protections Do Not Become
Obsolete?
The wiretapping adjudications raise a
two-fold problem. First, the cases illustrate that
Internet-based communications are not
protected by the current wiretapping laws.121
Second, the cases illustrate the broader
problem of legal obsolescence in the
technological area.1 24 The solution proposed
in Section IV would address both aspects of
the problem through the creation of laws
independent of technology and thus
independent of the obsolescence problem.
A. The Immediate Problem:
Protecting Internet Communicat-
ions
Though the wiretapping adjudication
has focused for the most part on what could
be termed "traditional Internet-based
communications," the cases have broader
implications. The expanding use of Internet-
based communications, such as Voice over
Internet Protocol ("VoIP'), brings voice and
video communications within the scope of the
e-mail case-law.2 5 Thus, under this reading of
the case-law, virtually all Internet-based
communications can be intercepted without
legal recourse.
Internet-based communications are
communications sent from one networked
computer to another.1 26 Most Internet-based
communications function similar to e-mail
messages sent from computer via Simple
Message Transfer Protocol (SMTP), the
predominate e-mail protocol. 127 Under SMTP,
the messages are not sent directly from one
computer to the next; rather, the messages are
sent through a number of intermediate servers
before arriving at their final destination. 28 The
messages are generally sent from the creating
computer to the nearest server. 129 That server
then finds where the message should be sent
and forwards it.130 The message is passed from
server to server until it reaches its final
destination.1 3' Prior to sending the message
on to the next server, the servers often store a
temporary copy of the message. 132 This
procedure allows the server to route messages
more efficiently and handle for higher than
normal traffic volumes.133 Because it sends
messages from server to server and does not
require a direct connection, the Internet is able
to send messages between two different
computers through a number of alternative
paths.134
Due to this prolonged process of
transmission, the Internet is a redundant
communications medium, wherein messages
pass through many intermediate servers before
arriving at their final destination. The courts,
however, have held that as messages pass
through the intermediate servers, they are not
protected against unauthorized interception
and dissemination. 135  The courts have
consistently held that messages are not
protected when they are stored on intermediate
computers, even though the storage is incident
to their transmission.1 36 Rather, messages must
be intercepted while in transmission for a




While the ever increasing reliance upon
e-mail and other text based messaging systems
would make these holdings troubling enough,
the rapid increase in other forms of Internet-
based communications has only worsened the
situation. In recent years, Internet
communications have grown to include
telephone and video services. 138 Illustrating the
rapid adoption of these technologies, one
provider, Vonage, saw its subscriber base
quadruple in 2004.139 Using this technology,
commonly known as VoIP, a number of
companies, including Vonage and Comcast,
allow residential and business customers to
communicate telephonically without using a
traditional telephone line.4 °
VoIP systems use communications
protocols similar to those of more traditional
Internet communications techniques such as e-
mail and other text messaging.' 41 Thus the
security of a company's entire communications
system, both text-based and voice-based, could
be compromised; and, under current
wiretapping law, these companies would have
no apparent legal recourse. 142 According to the
federal courts current construction of the
B. The Long-term Problem: Deal-
ing with Legal Obsolescence
Though the wiretapping law's failure to
protect Internet-based communications is a
problem in itself, it is also illustrative of a bigger
issue that will continue to plague our
technology based society for the foreseeable
future. Many laws are written with a specific
technology in mind and they are thus tailored
to fit the problems native to that technology.
Over time, however, in a vibrant society such
as ours, Schumpeter's law of creative
destruction will render the specified technology
obsolete.144 The technology that rendered the
first technology obsolete, however, will not be
protected by our legal system. The law that
protected the old technology will likely be
adapted to its inner workings. Thus, the
workings of the new technology will most likely
set it outside of the four corners of the existing
law. The new technology will render obsolete
not only the old technology but also the related
law.
This process of legal obsolescence has
been illustrated by the evolution of the
wiretapping laws. The first wiretapping laws
r "The courts, however, have held thatas messages that pass through theintermediate servers, they are not
protected against unauthorized
interception and dissemination"
wiretapping laws, communications can only be
intercepted while in transmission.
143
Consequently, the law would not apply to any
portions of the communication that are stored
on the servers, even if the storage was incident
to the transmission. These communications
could be read by the owners of any server that
they happened to pass through. Such a result
clearly runs counter to the stated intent of
Congress and is both inequitable and unjust.
were created in the late 1960's and focused on
the nature of the telephone industry. 45 At that
time the monopolistic system "Ma Bell" was in
place, and thus, the law focused purely on
telephone conversations carried over the
common carrier. 146 Less than twenty years later,
the break up of Ma Bell and the advent of new
technology necessitated a complete rewriting
of the wiretapping laws. 47 However, even this
rewrite did not offer communications
protections for very long as courts found that
the wiretapping laws did not cover certain
electronic communications. 14 Thus, a mere
541 Vanderbilt journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
INTERNET
eight years after the law had been modified, it
was already becoming obsolete.'49 Since 1994,
the obsolescence of the law has continued with
each Circuit Court decision; no one has stopped
the decline.
50
On a broad level, the obsolescence of
laws poses significant problems for our legal
system and our society as a whole. As the
Circuit Court decisions illustrate, judges are
often unwilling to act beyond the legislative
mandate in areas of criminal law.'5 ' Thus, in
the wiretapping arena, the same
communication might be sent over two
mediums, it would appear identical to the
sender and receiver, but it would receive very
different legal treatment.5 2 This differing legal
treatment adds uncertainty to the marketplace
of technology.153 As business and consumers
discover that their use of new technology may
not be given the same protections as the old,
they will alter their behavior accordingly by not
using the new technology to its full extent.
54
This reduced use of the new technology will
lead to the loss of the efficiency that the new
technology would provide.5 5 To prevent this
loss of efficiency, and the resulting damage to
narrow solutions seek to extend the protection
of the wiretapping law to Internet-based
communication and thereby solve the pressing
problem. The broad solutions seek to address
both the immediate problem of Internet-based
communications, as well as put in place a
framework for the courts to handle issues that
arise from new communications technology.
For the reasons explained below, a broad
legislative solution would offer the best answer.
A. The Narrow Judicial Solution
A narrow solution crafted by the
judiciary would look beyond the plain
language of the wiretapping law and expand
the law to conform to the intent of Congress.
Such an approach was offered by Judge Lipez
in his dissenting opinion in Councilman.
156
In Councilman, Judge Lipez noted that
"the legislative history [of the wiretapping laws]
demonstrates that Congress was deeply
concerned with the emerging threats to privacy
and the failure of existing legal protections to
cope with these threats." 157 Congress intended
to protect the privacy of e-mail, because it did
not perceive any constitutional protections
"Since 1994, the obsolescence of
the law has continued with each
Circuit Court decision andLnothing has been done to stop
the decline.
the economy and society as a whole, the law
must find a way to deal with new technology
as it develops. By reducing the lag between
technology adoption and legal administration
of the technology, the law will encourage earlier
adoption of new technology and the attendant
benefits to society.
I1 The Solution
The solutions have been divided into two
categories: narrow and broad solutions. The
existed for it.158 Judge Lipez stated that the plain
language of the statue does not address whether
storage incident to transmission of e-mail is
considered a transmission which can be
intercepted. 59 Further, Judge Lipez declared
that the majority's rationale was flawed, and he
found "it inconceivable that Congress could
have intended [that e-mails not be protected by
the wiretapping laws] merely by omitting the
term 'electronic storage' from its definition of
'electronic communication.' "160 Thus, he would
have held that e-mails could be intercepted
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because it was the purpose and intent of
Congress to protect communications, including
electronic communications.
161
Judge Lipez's approach would solve the
problem of protecting Internet
communications by looking to congressional
intent to fill in gaps in the wiretapping laws.
However, it appears unlikely that his approach
would be uniformly adopted as five separate
Circuit Courts of Appeal have rejected it.
162
Judge Lipez makes a very persuasive case for
looking beyond the text of the wiretapping laws
to find protections for Internet
communications. Nevertheless, as previously
illustrated, most of the courts that have
examined the problem have refused to go
beyond the "four corners" of the law, insisting
that Congress must cover its own bases.
163
A court following Judge Lipez's
approach would run counter to all previous
circuit court adjudication. Therefore the best
case scenario for this approach would be for a
circuit split to develop, which might lead the
Supreme Court to resolve the split in favor of
using congressional intent to fill in the
wiretapping law's gaps. This scenario also seems
very unlikely as courts have consistently chosen
not to follow this route. 164 In fact, the Ninth
Circuit, which harbors an activist reputation,
165
and the Fifth Circuit, whose reputation is
decidedly conservative, 166 have both rejected
Judge Lipez' logic. 167 Thus, the narrow judicial
solution is a perilous approach at best.
Additionally this approach would do
nothing to protect new technologies. Judge
Lipez' approach could be used to protect e-mail
and other Internet-based communication
because Congress clearly intended to protect
it. However, if a new technology which had
never been discussed in Congress were at issue,
this approach would not be helpful, because
the judge would have no congressional
guidance at all. Thus the narrow judicial
approach does nothing to address the broader
problem of dealing with the obsolescence of
laws.
B. The Narrow Legislative Solution
Legislation pending in the House of
Representatives, if enacted, would extend the
protections of the wiretap law to Internet
communications."" There are two bills
pending, each of which would amend the
wiretap law by expanding either the definition
of "interception" or the definition of "electronic
communication." 169 The plain language of the
wiretapping laws would thus allow for
protection from interception of e-mails and
other Internet-based communications. 17 In
this way, as suggested by the Fraser court,
Congress would finally cover its bases.
While the proposed legislation would
resolve the narrow issue of protecting e-mail
and other Internet-based communications
from wiretapping, it would not help to
protect communications proactively. Should
the underlying technology change, Congress
would then have to amend the law again to
reflect the changes. Consequently, though
this solution would solve today's problem, it
would do nothing to prevent the legal
uncertainty that would accompany any
future technological innovations.
C. The Broad Judicial Solution: The
Institution of a Right to be Left
Alone
A judicially imposed solution could cre-
ate a framework that would protect communi-
cations, and thereby both protect existing
Internet-based communications and provide
guidance for protecting new forms of commu-
nications yet to be invented. Such a framework
could be created using pre-existing Constitu-
tional and tort concepts employing a minimum
of two components: one grounded in the Fourth
Amendment pertaining to Government intru-
sion and the other based on the tort of invasion
of privacy.
1. Protections based on the
Fourth Amendment to re-
strain government intrusion
and tort law could rotect
communications in tfe civil
realm through an expanded
use of invasion of privacy doc-
trine.
A judicial doctrine constraining govern-
ment intrusion on communications generally
could be based on Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Olmstead v. U.S. Recognizing that the protec-
tions enumerated in the Constitutional Amend-
ments must be given broad scope, Brandeis
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
INTERNET
stated:
The makers of our Constitution under-
took to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and his intellect...
They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone - the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men. To protect, that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by
the government upon the privacy of the
individual, what ever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.
172
Thus courts could protect communications
from governmental intrusion by broadly inter-
preting the Fourth Amendment to give a gen-
eral protection from unauthorized governmen-
tal intrusions. Such protections could be ex-
tended to new technologies as they are devel-
oped.
In Katz v. U.S., the Supreme Court
adopted much of Brandeis' reasoning. 73 The
Katz Court stated that whatever a person
"knowingly exposes to the public even in his
own home or office, is not subject to Fourth
Amendment Protection ... [but what a person]
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." 174 However, the Court declined to
expand the protections beyond the scope of
government intrusions on privacy that were
not authorized by a magistrate.7 5 The govern-
ment is therefore constrained from intrusions
that are not authorized by a judicial actor. Thus
there already exists a foundation for courts to
protect the privacy of communications, where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy,
without regard to the medium from govern-
ment intrusion.
Because the Katz Court refused to ex-
tend a general right to be left alone, 76 commu-
nications must be given additional protections
from nongovernmental parties. In fact, such a
tort was proposed in Brandeis and Warren's The
Right to Privacy.177 Courts have already found
liability for wiretapping under the "unreason-
able intrusion" rubric of invasion of privacy.78
It would be only a small step to add Internet-
based communications to the protected class
of communications, and thereby provide a rem-
edy against civilian actors.
Therefore, by implementing this frame-
work, the courts could protect communications
that have been adopted by the public but are
not yet covered by the wiretapping laws. Us-
ing the reasoning employed in Katz, courts
could protect new communications from in-
terference by governmental actors. 179 Commu-
nications could be similarly protected from ci-
vilian interception by expanding the tort of in-
vasion of privacy. Furthermore, as the protec-
tion of the framework is based upon individual
rights rather than particular technologies, the
framework will protect communications with-
out regard to the mode of transmission. Thus,
the framework will protect the Internet-based
communications at issue in the recent wiretap-
ping cases, 80 as well as communications over
technologies which have not yet been invented.
"Technology-independent laws
would not seek to replace laws that
regulate the issues specific to a given
technology, but rather they would




2. The implementation of such
a framework could prove to be
significant undertaking.
However, this framework is unlikely to
be uniformly adopted. The solution necessar-
ily involves many different actors. Each court
would create its law based on the cases that
come before it, leaving open the possibility that
widely disparate opinions would be handed
down. The variance in state invasion of pri-
vacy torts could lead to complicated jurisdic-
tional fights. Further, Internet-based commu-
nications allow a user in one state to retrieve
information from servers in other states. Thus,
a court wishing to find liability for invasion of
privacy for intrusion into Internet-based com-
munications would first have to find the cor-
rect law to apply. Conceivably, the court could
be faced with the choice of the law of the
plaintiff's state, the law of the state where the
server is located (arguably the location of the
breach), and the law of the defendant's state.
Each state's law could prove beneficial to a dif-
ferent party, and, as such, would surely lead to
bitter choice of law disputes. These complica-
tions would make the invasion of privacy route
difficult at best.
Furthermore, creating such a frame-
work would require a certain level of judicial
activism with which many judges would be
uncomfortable. By applying this framework
to new technologies the courts would arguably
be creating new law, an unattractive prospect
for many judges.
D. The Broad Legislative Solution:
Technology-Independent Laws
The best solution would entail Congress
creating laws which protect communications
in the abstract without dealing with technologi-
cal specifics. Such laws would avoid the uni-
formity problems of the judicial framework
because they would be adopted on a federal
level.l  These technology-independent laws
would lay out in abstract terms the protections
that are offered to communications. Technol-
ogy-independent laws would not seek to replace
laws that regulate the issues specific to a given
technology; rather, they work hand in hand
with the more specific law. The more specific,
technology-dependent laws would relate to the
technology-independent laws much as admin-
istrative regulations relate to congressional leg-
islation. That is to say that they would create
solutions to the specific problems that the tech-
nology raised. Technology-independent laws
would essentially be statements of principles
that judges could use to decide cases involving
new technology until laws pertaining to the spe-
cific technology have been created. Judges
would be given the guidance they need to rule
on issues pertaining to a specific technology
even though the legislative bodies have not yet
addressed it. As the laws would not address
specific technologies, they would not become
obsolete when new technologies are created.
Further, as the technology-independent
laws would not be constrained by innovations,
they would address problems such as those
raised in the recent circuit court cases. 182 The
courts will be able to decide these cases even
though the technology does not fit within the
four corners of the wiretapping laws because
Congress will have given them broad guidance
with which to do so. Thus, a broad legislative
solution would solve the immediate problem
created by Internet-based communications, as
well as the broader problem of legal obsoles-
cence.
1. The underlying principles
of the broad legislative solu-
tion
While any legislative solution as broad
as the one proposed would be the subject of
much debate and compromise, one can specu-
late about the broad contours of such a solu-
tion based upon the current laws. A common
requirement is that protected communications
must be reasonably believed to be private.183
Thus a broad statutory protection should be-
gin with the statement that all communications
reasonably believed private are to be protected
from unwanted intrusions of any kind.
Furthermore, the courts and Congress
have not left the right to privacy in communi-
cations unfettered. For example, the law allows
for government intrusion when a magistrate
deems such intrusion necessary to prosecute
criminal activity.84 Moreover, private interven-
tions by service providers are allowed when they
are necessary to maintain the service.1 5 Thus
any abstracted law must allow for reasonable
interventions by government and service pro-
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viders. The extent of the interventions would
be a matter for debate.
2. An example of a law based
on the above principles
Based on the preceding considerations,
and borrowing heavily from the present wire-
tapping laws,186 the following act could be pro-
posed:
§ 1. Definitions
As used in this title -
1) "protected communication" means
any form of human interaction, be it
oral, aural, visual, electronic, or other-
wise, conveyed by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communica-
tion is not subject to interception under
circumstances and not intended for
public dissemination;
2) "intercept" means the acquisition of
the contents of a protected communi-
cation by any unauthorized party;
3) "unauthorized party" means any
person not intended to receive or com-
prehend the contents of a protected
communication;
4) "contents" means any part of a hu-
man interaction;
5) "person" means any employee, or
agent of the United States or any State
or political subdivision thereof, and any
individual, partnership, association,
joint stock company, trust, corporation,
or other legal entity.
§ 2. Interception of Protected Commu-
nication
(1) Offense. - Except as provided in sub-
section (2) of this section, an unautho-
rized party who -
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors
to intercept, or procures any other per-
son to intercept or endeavor to intercept
any protected communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use,
or procures any other person to use or
endeavor to use any protected commu-
nication;
(c) intentionally discloses, endeavors to
disclose, or procures any other person
to disclose or endeavor to disclose any
protected communication;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to
use, the contents of any protected com-
munication, knowing or having reason
to know that the information was ob-
tained through the interception of a pro-
tected communication in violation of
this subsection;
shall be punished as provided in sub-
section (3) or shall be subject to suit.
(2) It shall not be unlawful for -
(a) a law enforcement official, duly au-
thorized by a magistrate and during the
course of official duties;
(b) a person or entity of providing com-
munication service whose assistance has
been request by a person described in
part (a) of this subsection or who is per-
forming functions deemed essential to
the maintenance and assurance of the
quality of their service;
to intercept protected communication.
(3) whoever violates subsection (1) of
this section shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
3. The broad legislative solu-
tion would solve both the nar-
row and broad problems posed
by the recent decisions
Creating a more abstract law protect-
ing the privacy of communications would add
a measure of certainty to the interactions of law
and new technology. It would not prevent the
creation of more specific laws that fit within the
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overall framework, rather it would merely give
judges guiding principles to aid in their deci-
sion-making. By creating a statutory framework,
Congress will provide the courts with the tools
to deal with technologies that do not fit within
more specific laws and ensure that the law ap-
plies uniformly across diverse jurisdictions.
IV. Conclusion
Our present information age is marked
by rapid changes in technology. People have
become increasingly willing to adopt new in-
novations in their daily lives. While it is pos-
sible that some dystopic horror such as those
illustrated in early Mel Gibson films could oc-
cur, this scenario is highly unlikely.87 Thus,
we must assume that society will continue to
make technological improvements at or above
its present rate.
The changing technology will necessar-
ily make technologically-based law obsolete.
The evolution of the wiretapping laws shows
that when laws are designed around a specific
technology, they will be vulnerable to obsoles-
cence due to technological changes. The wire-
tapping laws were first created to address the
needs of a communications network based
around a large monopoly, and they necessarily
needed revision when that monopoly was bro-
ken up.18  More recently, the present laws have
been held to not apply to new Internet-based
forms of communications. 89
When laws become obsolete because
their underlying technology has passed out of
popular use, society suffers.190 During the time
between the obsolescence of the law and the
creation of new law applicable to the new tech-
nology, there is uncertainty leading to lowered
rates of technology adoption and the attendant
efficiency gains.'9 ' Thus, the law must find a
way to address areas of rapid technological
change.
The creation of technology-independent
laws will reduce uncertainty by giving judges
guiding principles by which to address new
technologies. 192 These laws would not seek to
replace laws specifically tailored to the needs of
particular technologies. 193 Rather, they would
more abstractly state the underlying principles
of the law relating the area of a particular tech-
nology and thereby apply to all technology in
the area whether old or new.94 By creating tech-
nology-independent laws, the legislators may
ensure that there will be continuity in the law
even if the technologies which the law addresses
are in flux.
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